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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DENNIS EARL WHEELER 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Docket No. 970256-CA 
-vs-
DIANE DAWN WHEELER, Priority Classification 15 
Defendant/Appellee. 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE JUDGE BOHLING PRESIDING 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over 
this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-(l) (h) (1953 as 
amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue before the Court is whether the lower court 
correctly set aside the parties' divorce decree with regard to 
the military retirement benefits where the lower court found no 
consideration for Appellee's stipulation waiving her right to her 
share of the retirement account and Appellee immediately promptly 
1 
moved to set aside the decree. 
"A trial court's decision to grant or deny a 60(b) motion 
will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Utah App. 1994)(citations omitted). 
"Findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are against 
the clear weight of the evidence and clearly erroneous with due 
consideration given to the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses." Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 
180, 186 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted) . 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
There are no provisions determinative to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I.NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce action and motion arising from the decree 
entered. The parties were married for seven years. The parties 
entered a stipulation in 1995 in which Appellee agreed to waive 
her right to her share of Appellant's retirement benefits. The 
agreement was entered into by mistake and excusable neglect by 
Appellee as evidenced by the lack of consideration for the waiver 
of her rights to the only marital asset and her prompt motion to 
set aside the stipulation and decree. 
II.COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The court below, the Honorable Judge Bohling presiding, 
2 
entered the Decree of Divorce on December 7, 1995. The decree 
was entered pursuant to a stipulation. Appellee retained new 
counsel and then made a timely motion to set aside the decree 
because of excusable neglect and mistake, pursuant to Rule 60(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. After hearing, Judge 
Bohling ordered that the decree be set aside concerning the 
retirement benefits due to mistake and excusable neglect, as 
evidenced by the lack of consideration for Appellee's waiver and 
her prompt motion to set aside. 
Appellant's Notice of Appeal was filed on April 28, 1997. 
III.STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were married on November 4, 1988. (Affidavit of 
Defendant, attached as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein). 
During the marriage, Appellee was primarily a homemaker and took 
care of the parties' two children. (Exhibit "A"). Appellant was 
employed by the United States Army and had been so employed for 
approximately ten years. (Exhibit "A"). 
Appellee retained Steven C. Russell as her counsel to 
represent her in this divorce action. (Exhibit "A"). Appellee 
entered into the settlement agreement based upon misinformation 
given to her by her then counsel as well as the opposing party. 
(Exhibit "A"). Even at the initial hearing on the 60(b) motion, 
opposing counsel argued that Appellee waived her right to her 
share of the retirement benefits "because it wasn't of a great 
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deal of worth to her." (Transcript of the Hearing, p. 12, 1. 2-
4, an excerpt is attached as Exhibit "B" and incorporated 
herein). 
In addition, Appellee was repeatedly misinformed that she 
would never get any of the retirement benefits. (Exhibit "A"). 
The misunderstanding concerning her right to her share of the 
retirement benefits was raised again in Appellant's Docketing 
Statement for appeal where Appellant stated that "[t]he 
[Appellee] does not have a legal right to the [Appellant's] 
nonvested military retirement benefits, inasmuch as the parties 
were not married for ten (10) years as required by the Uniform 
Services Former Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408." 
(Appellant's Docketing Statement, p. 3, a copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein). There is no 
doubt that Appellant's share of the retirement benefits has 
substantial value to her and there is no doubt that she has a 
legal right to her share according to Utah law. (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, 58, attached as Exhibit "D" and 
incorporated herein). The mistake, based on the misunderstanding 
of Appellant's right to her share of the retirement benefits, is 
further evidenced by the lack of consideration for the waiver of 
such right. (Exhibit "D", 511). 
Upon retaining new counsel, Appellee was informed of her 
rights under Utah law and became aware of the mistaken 
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interpretation of the law. (Exhibit "A"). Had the correct 
information been available to Appellee, she would not have 
entered into the stipulation waiving her rights to her share of 
the retirement benefits without consideration. (Exhibit "A"). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The lower court's ruling should be affirmed because (1) 
Appellant has failed to cite to the record in support of his 
appeal; (2) Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence as is 
required in order to overturn the lower court's findings of fact; 
(3) Appellant's appeal is based on facts and issues not raised at 
the trial court level; and (4) the lower court did not abuse its 
discretion in granting Appellee's motion. In addition, Appellee 
should be awarded her costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
connection with this appeal pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE MERITS OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT NEED NOT BE REACHED 
DUE TO APPELLANT'S LACK OF CITATION TO THE RECORD TO 
SUPPORT HIS ARGUMENT. 
The Utah Appellate Court has consistently held that if 
counsel on appeal does not provide citations to the record, we 
need not reach the merits of his or her substantive claims." 
State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1989)(citing Arnica 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah App. 1989). 
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In the Facts section of Appellant's Brief, Appellant fails to 
cite to the record at all on page two. Appellant's only 
citations to the record are to an unsigned statement by Susan 
Bradford and the Affidavit of Steven Russell. In addition, 
Appellant argues many other facts that are absent from the 
record. 
Appellant's Brief argues that Appellee "agreed not to pursue 
her small share of Appellant's military pension in consideration 
for his promise not to assert claims of greater visitation 
rights, his relinquishment of claims he had rising out of the 
$25,000 he sent to her during his absence, and his agreement to 
settle the matter quickly." (Appellant's Brief, pg. 3). However 
there is no citation to the record. The reason there is no 
citation to the record is that this information is absent from 
the record. In fact, at the lower court, Appellant argued that 
Appellee relinquished her right to the retirement benefits 
"because it wasn't of a great deal of worth to her." Nowhere in 
the transcript, or any affidavit, did Appellant allege that 
Appellee exchanged her right to the retirement benefits for 
Appellant's promise to forgo a claim for $25,000.00 in money 
provided during the separation. 
Appellant provides no citation to any agreement to exchange 
Appellee's share of the retirement benefits for Appellant's 
promise to forego claims concerning visitation or any money. The 
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statement of Susan Bradford does not contain any such agreement, 
nor does the Affidavit of Mr. Russell contain any information 
concerning a trade of visitation or some money claim in exchange 
for Appellee's right to her share of the retirement benefits. In 
fact, Mr. Russell states that Appellee "readily agreed that it 
was in the best interests of the minor children that the 
[Appellant] have extended periods of visitation . . . ." 
(Exhibit "B" of Appellant's Brief). Clearly there was no quid 
pro quo concerning visitation. 
The complete lack of citation to the record concerning any 
claim for money renders any alleged issue concerning this money 
"trade" invalid and the court should not reach the merits due to 
this lack of citation. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF FACTS CONCERNING THE LACK 
OF CONSIDERATION SHOULD NOT BE OVERTURNED BECAUSE OF 
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE. 
"To overturn a trial court's finding of fact, Nan appellant 
must first marshal all the evidence supporting the findings and 
then demonstrate that, even if viewed in the light most favorable 
to the trial court, the evidence is legally insufficient to 
support the findings." Bailey-Allen, 945 P.2d at 186 (citing 
Coalville City v. Lundareen, 930 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Utah App. 
1997)(quoting Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 
1989)), cert, denied, 939 P.2d 683 (Utah 1997). Appellant failed 
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to marshal any evidence in support of the lower court's finding 
that xMi]t is clear from the face of the Findings and Decree that 
[Appellee] did not 'trade her interest in [Appellant's] 
retirement for any other marital asset . . . [Appellee] 
relinquished her right to [Appellant's] retirement for no return. 
There was no 'benefit of the bargain.'" 
Appellant did not marshal the evidence concerning the 
misinformation about Appellee's right to her share of the 
retirement account. Appellant did not marshal the evidence 
concerning the lack of consideration for Appellee's waiver of her 
rights due to the misinformation. The majority of Appellant's 
brief argues about the existence of some alleged agreement 
concerning visitation and some alleged claim concerning marital 
funds, however, no facts concerning this alleged agreement are 
present in the record, nor were these facts argued at any time to 
the lower court. 
Due to Appellant's complete lack of marshaling the evidence, 
Appellant has failed to demonstrate that if the evidence 
supporting the lower court's findings are viewed in a light most 
favorable to the trial court, the evidence is in any way legally 
insufficient to support the findings. Therefore, the findings of 
fact can not be set aside. Bailey-Allen, 945 P.2d at 186. 
III. APPELLANT FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF CONSIDERATION 
FOR THE RETIREMENT BENEFITS AT THE TRIAL LEVEL AND 
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THEREFORE THE APPELLATE COURT IS PRECLUDED FROM 
CONSIDERING THE MERITS OF SAID ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
"Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion are 
deemed waived, precluding [the appellate court] from considering 
their merits on appeal." Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 
653, 655 (Utah App. 1989). In addition, N>[t]o preserve a 
substantive issue for appeal, a party must timely bring the issue 
to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court an 
opportunity to rule on the issues's merits." LeBaron & Assoc, v. 
Rebel Enterprises, Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah App. 
1991)(citations omitted). 
Appellant never raised any issue concerning an exchange of 
visitation rights or a claim concerning $25,000 for Appellee's 
waiver of her right to her share of the retirement benefits 
before the lower court. Therefore, the lower court was never 
provided an opportunity to rule on the merits of that issue. 
"[T]he mere mention of an issue in the pleadings, when no 
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority is introduced at 
trial in support of the claim, is insufficient to preserve the 
issue for appeal." Id. at 483 (citing James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 
799, 801 (Utah App. 1987). Further, this rule is " 'stringently 
applied when the new theory depends on controverted factual 
questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at 
trial.'" James, 746 P.2d at 801 (quoting Boaacki v. Board of 
Supervisors, 489 P.2d 537, 543-44 (Ca. 1971), cert, denied, 405 
9 
U.S. 1030 (1972)). 
As argued above, in the present case, Appellant never raised 
or substantiated any alleged facts concerning the use of 
visitation or a claim for money as consideration. At the lower 
court, Appellant argued that Appellee "agreed to waive that right 
[to her share of the retirement benefits] because it wasn't of a 
great deal of worth to her." Appellant did not argue that 
Appellee contracted her right to her share of the retirement 
benefits in exchange for anything. Appellant never referred to 
any consideration at the hearing or in his response to the 60(b) 
motion. Appellant's new theory depends on controverted factual 
questions which were not brought up at the lower court. 
Therefore, because these issues were not raised at trial and 
because they depend on controverted factual allegations which 
were not raised at trial, this Court is precluded from 
considering the merits of these issues on appeal. 
IV. JUDGE BOHLING DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN GRANTING 
APPELLEE'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE IN REGARDS TO THE 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS. 
"[T]he court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons . . . mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect . . . ." UTAH R. 
Civ. PRO. 60(b). The trial court is granted broad discretion on 
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ruling on a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). 
See Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989). This is 
especially true in regards to divorce cases. See Boyce v. Boyce, 
609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980) . "A liberal standard for application of 
Rule 60(b) in divorce cases is justified by the doctrine of 
continuing jurisdiction that a divorce court has over its 
decrees. Clearly, a court should modify a prior decree when the 
interest of equity and fair dealing with the court and the 
opposing party so require." Id. at 931. 
In the present case, Judge Bohling had to decide whether or 
not to set aside a divorce decree which served to waive 
Appellee's legal right to her share of the retirement benefits 
without any consideration in return. In response, Appellant 
never argued that there was consideration for Appellee's waiver. 
Appellant only argued that Appellee willingly waived her right 
because "it wasn't of a great deal of worth to her." However, 
this furthers the argument that the agreement was entered into 
because of mistake and misinformation because the retirement 
benefits were the only substantial marital asset and Appellee's 
share has considerable value.1 Appellee was not allowed to 
present a claim for the retirement benefits due to the mistaken 
1
 However, even if Appellant's retirement amounts to 
$2,000.00/month for his 20 years of service Appellee's share 
would have the value of 7 (years of marriage) divided by 20 
(years of service) multiplied by .5 (her share) multiplied by 
2000 (the estimated benefit per month), which equals $350.00 per 
month, presumably for 20 years, which amounts to $84,000.00. 
11 
information provided to her concerning her right to the 
retirement benefits and the approximate value of those benefits. 
Further, Appellee showed due diligence by immediately filing her 
motion to set aside upon discovering the mistake. 
Appellant cites Land v. Land for the proposition that 
"[ejquity is not available to reinstate rights and privileges 
voluntarily contracted away simply because one has come to regret 
the bargain made." 605 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980)(emphasis 
added). Appellant then states that Appellee failed to meet her 
burden for the relief she was seeking. Appellant fails to 
realize that there is no contract and no bargain where there is 
no consideration. Because AppeLlee was not allowed to present 
her rightful claim to her share of the retirement benefits due to 
the mistake and misinformation and given her due diligence as 
evidenced by her prompt filing of a motion to set aside, the 
trial court's granting of the motion was warranted. Warren v. 
Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741, 742 (Utah 1953). 
Appellee stated numerous times that she only signed the 
stipulation because of the mistake and misinformation provided 
her concerning her right to the military retirement benefits. 
(Exhibit "A"). Appellant counters these statements with the 
Affidavit of Mr. Russell. Judge Bohling had the opportunity to 
hear both sides and weigh which side was more credible concerning 
Appellee's understanding of her rights and the misinformation 
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concerning the retirement benefits. (Transcript, p. 15). "The 
trial court is in a better position to observe factors bearing on 
credibility and [the Appellate Court] will not disturb a factual 
assessment unless it clearly appears that the trial court was in 
error/' State v. R.C.F., 863 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App. 
1993)(citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 858 P.2d 
1363, 1367 (Utah 1993)). After weighing the different affidavits 
and the facts surrounding the decree, Judge Bohling stated that 
he was "persuaded that there was excusable neglect and mistake" 
and that "a clear right was relinquished for something that did 
not seem a basis for the bargain." 
In light of the complete lack of consideration for 
Appellee's waiver, the fact that the retirement benefits were the 
only substantial marital asset, Appellee's affidavit asserting 
the mistake and excusable neglect, Appellee's prompt filing of a 
motion to set aside upon learning of the mistake, and the broad 
discretion granted to the trial court in regards to ruling on 
60(b) motions, it is clear that Judge Bohling did not abuse his 
discretion in setting aside the decree with regards to the 
retirement benefits. 
V. APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO COURT COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
BECAUSE APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS NOT GROUNDED IN FACT AND 
NOT WARRANTED BY EXISTING LAW. 
"[I]f the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it 
13 
shall award just damages, which may include single or double 
costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to 
the prevailing party." Rule 33 UTAH R. APP. PRO. (1998). Rule 33 
continues by defining a frivolous appeal as "one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on 
a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing 
law." 
In Eames v. Eames, this Court held that a husband's appeal 
was frivolous where there was no basis for the argument presented 
and the evidence and law was mischaracterized and misstated. 735 
P.2d 395 (Utah App. 1987); £££ also. Hurt v. Hurt, 793 P.2d 948 
(Utah App. 1990). This is similar to Appellant's present appeal. 
Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence, failed to cite to 
the record, argued facts not on the record, and raised new issues 
on appeal. Such an appeal is frivolous. The appeal is not 
"grounded in fact," it is merely grounded in allegations which 
were not raised at the trial level. Appellant has failed to 
provide any basis for which this Court could grant his appeal. 
Therefore, this appeal is without merit and only serves to delay 
the lower court's ruling, increase Appellee's costs and 
attorney's fees, and waste the time and resources of this Court. 
"[S]anctions should be imposed when *an appeal is obviously 
without merit and has been taken with no reasonable likelihood of 
prevailing, and results in delayed implementation of the judgment 
14 
of the lower court; increased costs of litigation; and 
dissipation of the time and resources of the Law Court.'" Porco 
v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988)(quoting Auburn 
Harpswell Ass'n v. Dav, 438 A.2d 234, 239 (Me. 1981)). As argued 
in the previous sections, Appellant can not prevail where he 
fails to marshal the evidence, fails to cite to the record, 
argues new facts on appeal, and raises new issues on appeal. 
This frivolous appeal has greatly increased Appellee's costs and 
attorney's fees and serves only to impede the implementation of 
the proper ruling of the lower court and waste the time and 
resources of this Court. 
Therefore, pursuant to Rule 33, Appellee should be awarded 
her costs and attorney's fees in connection with this frivolous 
appeal in addition to any other damages this Court, in its 
discretion, decides to award Appellee. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has clearly failed to marshal the evidence, or any 
admissible evidence, in support of his appeal. Appellant has 
also failed to cite to the record in support of his appeal. 
Appellant has raised new issues and disputed "facts" not raised 
at any time on the trial court level. The facts, case law, and 
equity support the decision made by the trial court. Based on 
the foregoing, the decision of the trial court should be 
15 
affirmed. Further, Appellee should be awarded her reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Rule 33 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _J day of June, 1998. 
ILLIAMS, P.C, 
JET. WILLIAMS 
^Attorney for Appellee/Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on this of June, 1998, I mailed two 
true and accurate copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, 
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Tab A 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493 
Attorney for Defendant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
DENNIS EARL WHEELER, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DIANE DAWN WHEELER, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO VACATE AND SET ASIDE 
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND STIPULATION, 
AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 954902697 DA 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Comm. Lisa A. Jones 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW THE AFFIANT, Diane Dawn Wheeler, and, being first 
duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and 
over the age of 21 years. 
2. I am the Defendant in the above-captioned matter, the 
parties having been married on November 4, 1988. 
3. The parties have two children, Devin, who is seven years 
of age, and Valerie, who is five years of age. 
4. Plaintiff is a Second Lieutenant with the Army and has 
been so employed for, approximately, ten years. Affiant was a 
rq^^CJlo^\/|q Q/l'uHh 
homemaker and has no work skills, except for cashiering, and at the 
time of the entry of the Decree, and currently, earns a gross of, 
approximately, $750.00 per month. 
5. That at the time of the parties' settlement agreement and 
divorce, Affiant was informed that Plaintiff would have an income 
of, approximately, $2,500.00 because he would not get the dependent 
rate. However, Affiant was informed that Plaintiff remarried two 
to four days after the divorce became final and thus received an 
increase in pay of, approximately, $500.00. Affiant is informed 
and believes that Plaintiff knew that he was going to remarry and 
have this adjustment. 
6. Affiant does not have the money necessary to pay for one-
half of the costs for transportation for the minor children to 
visit with their father. Affiant also is in need of greater child 
support based upon Plaintiff's higher income. 
7. Affiant retained Steven C. Russell as her counsel to 
represent her in this divorce action. Mr. Russell did not keep 
Affiant informed as to her rights or obligations in this divorce. 
On every occasion that Affiant approached her counsel with 
concerns, her counsel would always tell her "Just relax and don't 
worry about it." "I'll take care of it." Her counsel was telling 
her this at the date of the pretrial before Commissioner Lisa A. 
Jones. At that time, as well, Affiant tried to find out what the 
meaning of joint custody, but her attorney did not explain it to 
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her and told her "Don't worry about it." On each occasion when the 
Affiant expressed to her counsel the fact that she did not like the 
terms of the agreement that was being proposed, her counsel told 
her "This is the best you can do " When Affiant asked her counsel 
about her rights to the Plaintiff's retirement, Affiant's counsel 
told her "You will never get it." 
8. Affiant entered into the settlement agreement resulting 
in this divorce action based upon the misinformation and lack of 
direction provided to her by her then attorney. Affiant feels that 
she was operating under extreme duress and pressure The divorce 
action had proceeded in an unusual fashion and Affiant had received 
no support or direction from her attorney. For example, on or 
about September 1, 1995, Plaintiff's counsel commenced telephoning 
Affiant at her home and at her work, trying to get her to sign a 
stipulation regarding an upcoming contempt motion. Affiant told 
Plaintiff's counsel, Jerry Schollian, that she would not talk to 
him. Regardless, he arrived at her home at 11:00 p.m., with papers 
m hand to have her sign a stipulation and release. Affiant's 
counsel was not present and Plaintiff's counsel was not invited to 
Defendant's home. Plaintiff's counsel, however, had in his hand 
child support checks and a receipt for her to sign to satisfy 
arrears and to avoid an upcoming contempt hearing. Affiant needed 
the funds and took the money from him. When Affiant approached her 
counsel about this unusual contact, he said not to worry about it. 
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9. I have been the primary caretaker of the children. Until 
the Christmas visitation this year, the longest time that the 
children were away from me was for two or three days and one one 
occassion, five days. I was pressured into agreeing to have them 
gone from me for six weeks and up to eight weeks the following 
year. I do not believe that it is in the children's best interest 
to be gone from me for that long. Affiant believes that they are 
too young. When Affiant questioned her attorney, he indicated that 
he believed the visitation was reasonable and that she should agree 
to it. However, Affiant's attorney never explained to her what 
joint custody was to mean or how she was to effectuate joint 
custody. She was told that it was reasonable to agree to joint 
custody without understanding what she was agreeing to. 
10. It is clear from the actions of the Plaintiff that the 
Affiant and Plaintiff cannot exercise joint custody and cooperate 
and coordinate with one another. For example, with the Christmas 
visitation, the Plaintiff took the children to the State of Alabama 
without even telling Defendant that he would be going there. He 
failed to provide Affiant with a telephone number or address where 
she could contact the kids and then informed Affiant's daughter 
that the Affiant did not even care enough to call her child. 
Further, the Plaintiff made all the arrangements for the travel for 
the visitation and did so without consulting with Affiant. It was 
Plaintiff that decided how and what the travel was to be and then 
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merely informed Affiant what her one-half share would be. By that 
time, the Affiant had already made plans to drive the children to 
the Plaintiff's home for Christmas. 
11. Affiant firmly believes that she was misinformed, mislead 
and not represented in her divorce settlement. Affiant is not 
simply having "buyer's remorse" or "sour grapes." Affiant has 
since consulted with her present counsel and learned and 
understands her rights and obligations, including her right to one-
half of the Plaintiff's retirement accrued during the marriage. If 
Affiant had known her legal rights, she would not have entered into 
the agreement at pretrial. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED t h i s \\ day o f ^ O f c l V I ^ U X W ^ 1996. 
U 
A^ \ W L IQtvflM'l 
DIME DAWN WHEELER 
ON THE ll day ot-yL^^^^ '/f~~ , 1996, personally 
V ? 
appeared before me, the undersigned notary, DIANE DAWN WHEELER, the 
signer of the foregoing Affidavit, who duly acknowledged to me the 
Affidavit was signed the same voluntarily and for its stated 
purp(0§^ r:'v.:; ~ SForV?n >v *r •, {' 
^,,^ , - ... _ _,. ....,.' &* 
1U\ V * ^ l ; J- ^3i^--'' 
•^^y ?#w.±i&f NOTARY PUBLIC 
STAT, , o r *.:'•::M 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon 
8c Williams, attorneys for the Defendant herein, and that I caused 
the foregoing Affidavit to be served upon Plaintiff by placing a 
true and correct copy of the same in an envelope addressed to: 
Jerry Schollian 
Attorney at Law 
111 East Broadway, #340 
SLC, Utah 84111 
and depositing the same in the United States mail, first class 




on active duty you cannot get your retirement until 60 
years of age. For that reason the defendant agreed to 
waive that right because it wasn't of a great deal of 
worth to her. 
I refer the Court to Birch versus Birch-- says 
that if when someone willingly waives a right, you can't 
go back and get it back again when it was waived. And 
she was fully and fairly informed. 
The defendants counsel has said that they're 
relying on surprise and excusable neglect. I strongly 
disagree with that, your Honor. When she had counsel she 
had a lot of time to think about it. If you will look at 
the attachments in my memorandum, the defendant prepared 
a divorce complaint and it was negotiated back and 
forth. My client filed a complaint that was acted upon. 
It wasn't until December 1995, six months after the 
initial negotiation, it was signed by this Court. 
The defendant had a long time to think about 
this, a long time to deliberate about it, a long time to 
get counsel. She got counsel. For her to come back 
immediately after the divorce decree is signed and say, 
well, I didn't know any better, does not reflect the 
facts of the case. 
I'm not trying to accuse anyone of being 




Jerry Schollian (6326) 
A Professional Corporation 
37 East Center Street, Suite 208 
Provo, UT 84601 
Tel: (801)-377-6500 
Attorney fn Plaintiff 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DENNIS EARL WHEELER 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs. 
DIANA DAWN WHEELER 
Defendant/Appellee. 
: DOCKETING STATEMENT 
: Case No. 970256-CA 
In accordance with Utah Rule Of Appellate Procedure 9, Appellant, by and through his 
attorney of record, hereby submits the following docketing statement 
1. DATE OF ENTRY OF ORDER APPEALED FROM: April 14, 1997; 
2. NATURE OF POST JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND DATES FILED: 
a) Motion Requesting Entry Of Specific Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law 
Date Filed: March 19, 1997 
b) Court's Minute Entry, Ordering defendant's counsel to enter specific findings of 
tact and conclusions o* law: Date: March 26, 1997. 
c) Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law: Filed on or about April 22, 1997. 
3. DATE OF EFFECT OF ORDERS DISPOSING OF POST JUDGMENT MOTIONS 
AND ORDER OF DETERMINATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT UNDER Utah R. Civ. P. 
54(b). NONE 
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4. DATE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL: April 22, 1997 
5. JURISDICTION: The Utah Court Of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. §76-2a-3(2)(h), (1953 as amended). 
6. NAME OF TRIAL COURT: Third Judicial District Court 
7. STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
a. The parties in this matter were married less than ten (10) years; 
b. In August, 1995, the parties meet for more than three (3) hours in the office 
of Susan Bradford, the attorney for the Guardian Ad Litem, and negotiated the terms of their 
divorce, (hereinafter, "settlement conference.*). Both parties were represented by counsel at the 
meeting. 
c. In October, 1995, the parties meet in the chambers of Commissioner Lisa 
Jones and read into the record a stipulation which was agreed to at the meeting. All parties were 
represented by counsel at said meeting. 
d. In the parties stipulation, defendant willingly relinquished all rights to-ahy 
equitable portion of the plaintiffs military pension. See Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of 
Law,atfl18. 
e. On December 7, 1995, the divorce decree was finalized by the Third District 
Court 
f. On January 18, 1996, defendant filed a motion under Utah Rule Of Civil 
Procedure 60(b), to set aside the divorce decree. 
g. On February 15, 1996, a hearing was held before Commissioner Jones on the 
defendant's Rule 60(b) motion. 
h. On or around July 18, 1996, the Honorable William Bohling entered an order 
on the defendant's rule 60(b) motion in which the defendant's motion was denied. 
i. Defendant subsequently filed an objection to the Commissioner's findings and 
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also filed a motion to amend the decree based on the same arguments set forth in the 
defendant's Rule 60(b) motion. 
j . On March 18, 1997, a hearing was held on the defendant's motion to set aside 
the Commissioner's findings as to the defendant's Rule 60(b) motion before the Honorable 
William Bohling Judge Bohiing overruled the all of the defendant's objections except for the 
objection as to defendant's equitable rights in the plaintiffs military retirement 
k. As a basis for his ruling, Judge Bohling held that the defendant received 
no "benefit of her bargain." 
8. ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. The Court abused its discretion by allowing the defendant to recapture rights she had 
willingly given away in the stipulation of the parties. Equity does not provide the defendant with 
the remedy she seeks under Rule 60(b). See Birch v. Birch. 609 P.2d 928, (Utah 1989), see 
also Bovce v. Bovce. 609 P.2d 928, (Utah 1980). 
II. The defendant's objections to the stipulation which she willingly agreed to are bared by 
the principle of res judicata. See Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121, (UL Ct App. 
1988). 
III. The defendant does not have a legal right to the plaintiffs nonvested military 
reti/pment benefits, inasmuch as the parties were not married for ten (10) years as required by 
the Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. §1408. 
S DETERMINATION OF CASE BY SUPREME COURT. This case is not subject tw 
^ovieyv by the Utah Supreme Court. 
10. DETERMINATIVE LAW: 
Ut. R. Civ. P. 60(b) 
Birch v. Birch. 609 P.2d928, (Utah 1989) 
Bovce v. Bovce. 6G9P.2dS28, (Utah 1980). 
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Throckmorton v Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). 
Jacobsonv Jacobson. 703 P.2d 303 (Utah, 1989) 
11. RELATED APPEALS: There are no other appeals in this matter 
12. ATTACHMENTS: The following documents are attached to this docketing 
statement 
a. Order On Defendant's Objection To Commissioner's Findings. 
b. Motion For An Order Of Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law 
c. Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law 
d. Notice Of Appeal 
e. Request For Transcript 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 3 3 /day of June, 
c\ 
erryfSchoilian^ 
:omW For Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This certifies that the undersigned has mailed a true and accurate copy of the preceding 
document to the following parties: 
Original to and three (3) copies to: 
Utah Court Of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Copies to: 
Ms. Kellie Williams 
808 East Center Street, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
DATED this 2 3 day of June, 1997 
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KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493 
Attorney for Defendant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 




Case No. 954902697 DA 
DIANE _ DAWN. WHEELER,, 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Defendant. Comm. Lisa A. Jones 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come on regularly for 
hearing before the above-entitled court on March 18, 1997, at the 
hour of 9:00 a.m., the Honorable William B. Bohling, Third Judicial 
District Court Judge, presiding, on Defendant's Objection to 
Commissioner's Recommendation denying Defendant's Motion to Vacate 
and Set Aside Decree of Divorce and Stipulation and Motion for 
Relief from Judgement, and Plaintiff not being present in person, 
but being represented by counsel, Jerry Schollian, and Defendant 
being present in person and being represented by counsel, Kellie F. 
and the court having reviewed the court file, including Defendant's 
motion to set aside Decree, Plaintiff's response, Affidavit of 
Steven Russell, and the commissioner's recommendation and resulting 
order, and having heard the proffers and arguments of counsel, and 
based thereon, the court now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on November 4, 1988 
and divorced by this court -on December 7, 1995. 
2. During the course of the parties' marriage, Plaintiff was 
employed in the United States Armed Forces. Defendant was a 
homemaker and accrued no retirement during the marriage. The 
parties had two children. 
3. The Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were entered by this court on December 7, 1995, 
which Decree, among other things, awarded Plaintiff all right, 
title and interest in his military retirement and did not award 
Defendant her marital share. 
4. At the time of the parties' divorce, the parties did not 
own any real property. 
5. At the time of the parties' divorce, Defendant was 
awarded a very minimal alimony award and ordered to pay one-half of 
the costs of transportation for purposes of Plaintiff exercising 
visitation with the minor children. Further, within the Decree of 
Divorce, in lieu of any claim that Plaintiff had on the parties' 
household furnishings and other jointly owned property, Defendant 
agreed to pay her own attorney's fees. There was no other 
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substantial property and within the Decree, it was found that all 
personal property accumulated by the parties had been divided, 
6. Subsequent to the entry of the Decree, Defendant sought 
new counsel and on or about January 19-, 1996, Defendant timely 
filed a 60(b) motion for relief from judgment and to set aside the 
Decree. Within that motion and an accompanying affidavit, 
Defendant stated under oath that she was never informed by her 
prior counsel of any rights to Plaintiff's retirement and that she 
was informed "you will never get it." 
7. Under 10 U.S.C. §1406(d)(2), a spouse or former spouse 
cannot be paid their retirement directly from the military fund and 
the retainer pay of the member unless they have been married for 
ten years during which there was ten years of service creditable to 
the member's retired pay. However, every state that has addressed 
the issue of a possible ten-year limitation on the award of the 
military retirement by the state court has rejected such an 
interpretation, holding that the ten-year provision in the U.S. 
Code applies only to situations in which direct payments are to be 
made by the secretary of a particular branch of the service to the 
non-military spouse. See, Marriage of Wood and Wood, 676 P.2d 338 
(Or. App. 1984); Oxelorren v. Oxelqren, 670 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. App. 2 
Dist. 1984); Konzen v. Konzen, 693 P.2d 97 (Wash. 1985); Levine v. 
Spickelmier, 707 P.2d 452 (Idaho 1985); Pacheco v. Ouintana, 730 
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P.2d 1 (N.W. App. 1985); Beltran v. Beltran, 227 Cal Rptr. 924 
(Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1986); Butcher v. Butcher, 375 W.E.2d 226 (W. 
Va. 1987); Stone v. Stone, 725 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. App. 1987); Scott v. 
Scott, 519 So.2d 351 (La. App. 2 Dir. 1988); Parker v. Parker. 750 
P.2d 1313 (Wy. 1988); Carranza v. Carranza, 765 S.W.2d 32 (Ky. App. 
1989); Warren v. Warren, 563 N.E.2d 633 (Ind. App. 2 Dist. 1990); 
DeLoach v. DeLoach, 590 So.2d 956 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1991) ; King 
v. King, 605 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio App. 12 Dist. 1992). 
8. In the state of Utahf Defendant is entitled to an 
equitable interest in Plaintiff's military pension. Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). 
9. It is clear from the face of the Findings and Decree that 
Defendant did not "trade" her interest in Plaintiff's retirement 
for any other marital asset• The marital assets of the parties 
were limited and the retirement appears to be the only substantial 
asset acquired by the parties during the marriage • 
10. Defendant had a clear right to a portion of Plaintiff's 
retirement. 
11. Defendant relinquished her right to Plaintiff's 
retirement for no return. There was no "benefit of the bargain." 
12. The affidavit of Defendant indicates to the court that 
there was clearly not an understanding by Defendant of her rights 
to Plaintiff's retirement and that her agreement to the award of 
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military retirement in full to Plaintiff constitutes mistake and 
excusable neglect under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes 
and enters the following: . 
CONCLUSIONS OF IAW 
1. The court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff and Defendant 
in this action and over the subject matter of this action* 
2. Defendant promptly and timely filed a motion pursuant to 
Rule 60(b) of the TJtah Rules of Civil Procedure and, as to the 
military- retirement, Defendants motion should be granted. 
3. No other terms or conditions contained within the 
parties' Decree of Divorce should be set aside. 
DATED this day of , 199 . 
BY THE COURT 
WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
District Court Judge 
Approved: 
JERRY SCHOLLIAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
DATED: 
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